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God's loving concern for his creatures, his solicitude, but not the agonizing
uncertainty and self-doubt that Kierkegaardian "anxiety" implies. Some attention
to this might have helped Nielsen clarify the meaning of the phrase, "God's
anxiety," and avoid the questionable claim that Climacus "picture[s] an anxious
God-man stepping fearfully among eggshells" (p. 40).
That said, let me repeat: this is a stimulating and well-written book which
presents Philosophical Fragments as a serious contribution to the philosophy of
religion. In contexts where historical questions are not paramount, or where they
can be treated separately, it will make a most valuable contribution.

The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, by Louis P.
Pojman. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1984. pp.,
xvi, 174. $17.50.
Reviewed by ROBERT L. PERKINS, University of South Alabama.
Louis Pojman's The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion is a ground-breaking effort and as such is presented with a proper tentativeness. There are some controversial arguments in the book, and it will on certain
points be hotly debated for some time.
Pojman's thesis is that Kierkegaard is "a philosopher, a thinker who uses
arguments, develops concepts and employs 'thought projects' to establish conclusions. He is a rationalist, who makes use of reason even if it is to show reason's
limits." With that assertion to defend Pojman, recognizing the complexities of
Kierkegaard's style, sets forth a number of his arguments in logical form. Pojman
does not resort to symbolization but sticks to ordinary language and Kierkegaard's
own vocabulary when he can in setting up the arguments in propositional form.
For this effort to show the bare bones, the order and the coherence (or lack
thereof) we are in Pojman's debt. Pojman also emphasizes, and he is among the
first to do so, Kierkegaard's use of, perhaps even acceptance of, Plato's notion
of recollection. Finally, Pojman has focused the teleological nature of Kierkegaard's view of man and ethics. A great deal of work remains to be done on
Kierkegaard's Platonism and teleology, but we owe Pojman thanks for the nudge.
We also note with complete approval that the book both begins and ends with
a reflection on Kierkegaard's theory of communication.
But reviewers are supposed not only to praise but also start the process of
moving the argument forward by means of criticism.
First, one notes the ambiguous relation Pojman bears toward the history of
philosophy. He writes " .. .in the last analysis I have wanted to know what
Kierkegaard has to say to us today with regard to faith. Extricated from his
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historical situation, does he have a message for us?" (p. xi) Those who object
to the historical and social study of philosophy must surely rejoice in this apparent
ahistorical approach to Kierkegaard. Yet Pojman' s practice does not extricate
Kierkegaard entirely from his historical situation and so Pojman gives no comfort
to the anti-historical tendency in much recent philosophy. Kierkegaard simply
cannot be extricated form either his social situation or from the history of philosophy. Pojman is much more successful in suppressing reflections on the social
situation than he is in suppressing the history of philosophy.
Still the references to the history of philosophy are unique. When discussing
Kierkegaard's theory of the will Pojman discusses James' "will to believe" rather
than the Kantian view of the will and the placement of the will in Hegel's
philosophy of subjective spirit and the Romantic theory of action. To be sure,
James has some tempting things to say about the will, but he is scarcely the best
light against which to silhouette Kierkegaard' s own concept of the will in spite
of the fact that there are similarities between them. James, however, expressed
his own view of the will not just as an apologetic for religious belief but also
in the sense of justifying action and as a rebuff to overly cautious methodological
considerations in science. James is calling attention to the fact that every new
scientific hypothesis is presented as unwarranted, that it requires a certain confidence and belief so that we can bestir ourselves to actually attempt the experiment. Finally, however, the new hypothesis requires verification in explicit
experimental situations in order to be accepted. Failing verification, no "will to
believe" can sustain a scientific hypothesis. To this point, there is little or no
relation to Kierkegaard's theory of the will. As is notorious, James' view of the
will is primarily directed to the meaning of religious experience for life. But
James' views do not approach the clearly Christian dimension that subjectivity
is untruth. James remains at the level of ordinary bourgeois religiosity.
Kierkegaard engages his concept of the will at the religious level, where
verification is not at all possible. What Pojman does not make entirely clear is
that the testability of religious hypothesis is worked out within life, in the
development of character, even of religious and Christian character, in the teleological view of man who finally comes to himself not in the ethical or the
religious but in the Christian. The willing to believe and the veracity of that
which is believed is tested in the development of the character traits such as
love, faith, hopefulness, patience, self-control, etc. As these traits become operative in the person, the truth of the gospel becomes apparent, not as a justified
hypothesis but as a form of life. Thus it actually turns out that the truth is that
which edifies. Edification warrants the truth claims. Then, too, Pojman does not
notice that in the phenomenology of the religious life that Kierkegaard is describing, believing is a gift. Thus it falls outside Pojman's neat dichotomy of believing
as act/believing as happening. In other words, Kierkegaard accepts what Pojman
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calls an indirect descriptive volitionalism. Belief for Kierkegaard is not in spite
of the facts. The edified life becomes the basis of the warranted belief. This
sounds much like James, but the paradox is missing in James.
Second, Pojman is himself a rationalist who several times asserts that our
external happiness depends upon our response to propositions, the proper response
being to believe them (p. 93, 106). That is indeed well and good, but in his
emphasis on argument and proposition Pojman has lost the important insight that
believing in the Christian sense of which Kierkegaard was talking was more like
believing a person than believing a proposition uttered by the person or a proposition about a person. The language of proposition is not richly textured enough
to grasp the qualitatively different concept of believing a person.
Finally, Pojman apparently does not understand the ruled usages ofthe language
we have slowly developed in philosophic and religious discourse. He writes
"Perhaps in heaven where, (pace Kierkegaard) faith is no longer required, passion
is also abolished." (p. 37) That is simply not to understand the ruled usage of
what the church means by heaven or what Kierkegaard means by passion and
faith. That statement is very clever, but it cannot advance the argument because
the ruled usages of the words are omitted. The same goes for the statement that
"God could have become an ape or a mouse" (p. 41) and that would have
maximized Kierkegaard's paradox. However, that just won't work because a
return to an animal as the representation of the God is a retrogressive step. It is
a reductio ad absurdum of a divine revelation to man, not a maximalization of
the paradox. The same is appropriate if we "assume God became a rattlesnake ...
(p. 41)". Both analogies forget the word, the vehicle of revelation to man.
This is a very provocative book, and these criticisms barely crack the door.
Still we are grateful for Pojman's shaking the foundations of Kierkegaard scholarship.

